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Abstract: In this paper I have analysed the answers which the following questions might receive: Can 
the Court invested with solving a motion to change venue decide on solving a trial already solved? 
Which could be the consequences of crediting the idea that the answer is in the affirmative in any 
situation, without any distinction? The law issue submitted to the analysis was generated by the 
circumstance that the civil Courts when they are invested with solving a case whose venue changing 
is requested, either decide to suspend the case until the motion to change venue is solved, or give a 
hearing date in order to solve this request. In our opinion, it is necessary an intervention of the 
legislator, as in practice, art. 145, paragraph (2), Civil Procedure Code was interpreted differently.  
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The law issue under analysis starts from a situation that becomes quite frequent in 
the practice of civil Courts of law, taking shape from the fact that the Courts, being 
approached for solving a case for which a motion to change venue was filed2, either 
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2“The venue changing is presented as a form of judicial extension of competency, because the 
prolongation of the Court competency to which the case was changed to is the effect of the judicial 
decision which approved the motion to change venue”. Please see (Boroi & Stancu, 2015, p. 254) The 
Court will renounce judging a case in favour of other Court of the same rank, for reasons that put to 
doubt its impartiality. Accordingly, the venue change represents “one of the procedure means which 
contributes to ensuring the effective character of judges’ impartiality, the institutional guarantee of 
the right to a fair trial”. Please see to this effect Decision no. 558/2014 of the Constitutional Court, 
published in the Official Gazette of Romania no. 897/10.12.2014, by which it is allowed the 
exception of unconstitutionality of the provisions of art. 142, paragraph (1), first thesis and of art. 
145, paragraph (1), first thesis from the Civil Procedure Code. In the same decision, the 
Constitutional Court, referring to its own jurisprudence, respectively Decision no. 333 from June 12th, 
2014, published in the Official Gazette of Romania no. 533 from July 17th, 2014, as well as to the 
jurisprudence of the Human Rights European Court (Decision from October 1st, 1982, pronounced in 
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decide to suspend the case until the motion to change venue is solved, or give a 
hearing date for solving this request.  
This hypothesis deals with the Court decisions invested with solving the case for 
which a motion to change venue is filed.  
Consequently, according to both the provisions of the former Civil Procedure Code 
and especially the provisions of the actual Code, although the judgement of the 
case was not suspended by the Court invested with the motion to change venue, the 
simple notification towards the competent Court to solve this motion of the Court 
from where venue changing was requested produces a dilatory effect, to the effect 
of those presented, respectively of suspending the case, or most frequently, of 
granting a Court hearing date (or many more dates) for solving the motion to 
change venue.   
Of course these “precaution” measures of the Courts had to have an explanation. 
Sometimes, the measures decided were justified on the grounds of ensuring each 
party that it would benefit from an impartial trial, which supposes inclusively 
giving them the possibility to check their assertions from the motion to change 
venue or making reference many times to the provisions of art. 145, paragraph (2), 
second thesis, Civil Procedure Code, meaning that, in case the Court will proceed 
to judge the trial, the decision given will be somehow lawfully dissolved by the 
effect of allowing the motion and, with the purpose of preventing the possibility to 
perform in this case acts submitted to annulment, a Court hearing date is given, 
being awaited the solution from the motion to change venue. 
Is this last hypothesis a real possibility or does it come from an interpretation not in 
conformity with the will of the legislator of the presented text of the law? 
In order to be able to answer to this question, a minimum rigour forces us to 
present the law texts that regulate the institution of trial venue change and mostly, 
the text that states the effects of allowing the motion to change venue.  
                                                                                                                                                   
Piersack Case against Belgium, paragraph 30), retains that “The Magistrate’s impartiality, as a 
guarantee of the right to a free trial, can be appreciated in a double sense: a subjective endeavour, 
that tends to determine the personal conviction of a judge in a certain case, that signifies a so-called 
subjective impartiality and an objective endeavour, with the purpose to determine if it offered 
guarantees sufficient for excluding any lawful doubt in its regard, this signifying the so-called 
objective impartiality”; “the subjective impartiality is presumed until the contrary; alternatively, the 
objective assessment of impartiality consists in analysing if, independently from the personal conduct 
of the judge, certain circumstances which can be checked bring forth some suspicions of lack of 
impartiality (The Decision of the Human Rights European Court from May 24th, 1989, pronounced in 
Hauschildt Case against Denmark, paragraph 47)”.  
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Thereby, according to art. 140, paragraph (1) and (2) Civil Procedure Code, the 
venue change can be requested for lawful suspicion or public safety reasons.    
The suspicion is considered lawful in the cases when there is a doubt regarding the 
impartiality of the judges due to the trial’s circumstances, to the parties’ capacity 
or to some local conflict relationships.    
The provisions of art. 142, paragraph (1) and (3), Civil Procedure Code, stipulate 
that: “The motion to change venue on the grounds of lawful suspicion is of the 
competency of the Court of Appeal, if the Court from where the venue change is 
requested is a Court or a Tribunal from its circumscription. If the venue change is 
requested from the Court of Appeal, the competence of solving it belongs to the 
High Court of Cassation and Justice. The motion to change venue is submitted to 
the competent Court for giving a solution, Court which will notify at once the 
Court from where the venue changing was requested in regards to formulating the 
motion to change venue. When receiving the motion to change venue, the Court 
with capacity to solve it will be able to request the case file”. 
According to the provisions of art. 143 and 144, Civil Procedure Code, at the 
request of the party interested, the Court panel can decide, if case maybe, to 
suspend judging the trial, giving a bail amounting to 1,000 lei. For solid reasons, 
the suspension can be decided in the same conditions, without summoning the 
parties, even before the first hearing date. The conclusion on suspension is not 
motivated and is not subject to any way of attack. The measure of suspending the 
judgment of the trial will be communicated urgently to the Court from where the 
venue changing was requested. 
The motion to change venue is judged urgently, in the Council Chamber, with 
summoning the parties from the trial. The decision on the venue changing is given 
without motivation and it is final. The Court from where the venue changing was 
requested will be notified immediately on allowing or rejecting the motion to 
change venue.   
According to art. 145 Civil Procedure Code, in case the motion to change venue 
was allowed, the Court of Appeal sends the trial for being judged to another Court 
of the same rank from its circumscription. The High Court of Cassation and Justice 
will change the venue for judging the case to one of the Courts of the same rank 
found in the circumscription of any of the Courts of Appeal in the neighbourhood 
of the Court of Appeal in whose circumscription there is the Court from which the 
venue changing is requested. 
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The decision will show to what degree the acts fulfilled by the Court before venue 
changing will be kept. In case the Court from where the venue changing was 
decided has meanwhile judged the trial, the decision given is lawfully annulled 
through the effect of allowing the motion to change venue. 
Reporting to the content of paragraph (2), second thesis of art. 145, Civil Procedure 
Code, we observe that this text institutes the mandatory effect of the lawful 
annulment of the decision in case the Court from where the venue changing was 
decided has “meanwhile” judged the case. 
In our opinion, this text cannot refer but only to the period between the trial venue 
changing and the decision being given, as well as the period after the trial 
judgement suspension given according to art. 143, paragraph (1), Civil Procedure 
Code, this being the only possible interpretation of the collocation “meanwhile” 
used by the legislator.  
The interpretation is in agreement with the content of the text in which it is shown 
that “in case the Court from where the venue changing was decided has meanwhile 
judged the trial”; the start moment of the period reflected by the collocation 
“meanwhile” cannot be but the decision to change the venue or, as we have shown, 
the decision of suspension until the motion to change venue is solved. 
The conclusion comes naturally from the circumstance that the Court invested with 
solving the motion to change venue could not decide to change the venue if the 
trial was solved (finally, because otherwise it is possible for the file to be subject to 
a new1 motion to change venue in the way of attack), the motion to change venue 
supposing a trial in progress in order to be allowed. 
In agreement with the provisions of art. 141, paragraph (1), Civil Procedure Code, 
the venue changing due to a lawful suspicion or public safety reasons can be 
requested in any phase of the trial.  
Or, according to the doctrine2, the phase of proper judgement (cognitio) ends by 
being pronounced a final decision. 
                                                          
1 According to the provisions of art. 146, Civil Procedure Code, trial’s venue changing cannot be 
requested again, except for the case when the new motion is set up on circumstances unknown at the 
date of solving the previous motion or occurring after its being solved.  
2 In agreement with the provisions of art. 141, paragraph (1), Civil Procedure Code, the venue 
changing for lawful suspicion or public safety reasons can be requested in any phase of the trial. Or, 
according to the doctrine, the phase of the proper judgement (cognitio) ends through giving a final 
decision. Please see (Boroi & Stancu, 2015, p. 4).  
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In these conditions, it appears the question which is the reason for which the text 
pointed out could lead to the interpretation (even isolated) that it is possible to 
change the venue of a trial finally solved, without making distinction if there was 
or not a request of suspension solved favourably. 
First of all, we are bound to notice that the collocation “meanwhile” cannot be 
explained but in a deductive way and the issue if a finalised case venue can be 
changed remains to be clarified at all times by the Court notified with the motion to 
change venue. 
Ayway, in the case when it was decided by the venue changing Court to suspend 
the trial according to article 143, Civil Procedure Code and, in spite of that, the 
judge proceeded to judge the case, we consider that the lack of object of the venue 
changing motion cannot be invoked.  
In this last hypothesis, we consider the judge invested with the motion to change 
venue will be able to decide trial venue changing, even if a decision was given in 
the case, the decision given being the consequence of not complying with the 
competent Court’s decision to solve the motion to change venue1.  
On the other hand, in order to identify the source of the possible wrong 
interpretation, it is necessary to check the content of this text before the change 
                                                          
1 To this effect there is also the practice of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, respectively 
Decision no.  2877/2005 pronounced on the date of May 13th, 2005, where it is mentioned: “Cluj 
Court of Appeal, Contentious Administrative and Commercial Division acted wrongly when judging 
the case for which the motion to change venue was filed, giving the civil decision no. 665 from April 
26th, 2005, because at this moment, the Conclusion from the date of April 8th, 2005, given by the  High 
Court of Cassation and Justice, was lawfully effective, according to which it was decided to suspend 
the judging in the file no. 13105/2004, until the date the request to change venue was solved. The 
measure of suspending the judging of the cause was communicated to the Court, and this measure of 
suspension is mandatory, being no possibility to fulfil any procedural act until the venue changing 
motion was solved, and in case there were committed procedural acts or the case had been 
meanwhile judged, the procedural acts fulfilled after the suspension and the decision are going to be 
annulled. In this context, the decision given by Cluj Court of Appeal, Commercial and Contentious 
Administrative Division, respectively the Civil Decision no.  665 from April 26th, 2005, is going to be 
annulled, being given a maximum legal efficiency to the measures decided regarding the suspension 
of judging the case and the Court to which it will be decided to send the venue change motion will 
have to proceed hereinafter with judging the case. 
For these legal reasons, the motion to change venue is going to be allowed, motion which is the 
object of file no. 13105/2004 of Cluj Court of Appeal, Commercial, Contentious Administrative and 
Fiscal Division, to Iasi Court of Appeal, maintaining the procedural acts performed up to the date of 
April 8th, 2005, inclusively, and annulling the procedural acts performed after the date of April 8th, 
2005, including the Civil Decision no. 665 from April 26th, 2005, given by Cluj Court of Appeal, 
Commercial, Contentious Administrative and Fiscal Division”. The Decision is given according to 
the former civil procedure law, but the reasoning of the Court remains valid.  
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occurred through Law no. 76/2012 for putting to practice Law no. 134/2010 on the 
Civil Procedure Code1.  
According to article 40, paragraph (5), Civil Procedure Code from 1865, in case 
the Court has made procedural acts or has meanwhile judged the cause, the 
procedural acts fulfilled after the venue changing and the decision given are 
lawfully annulled through the effect of allowing the motion to change venue.  
We therefore observe that the text comprised the same collocation “meanwhile”, 
but with the assignation that it expressly indicated that there are annulled those 
procedural acts fulfilled after the venue changing, as well as the decision given. 
Comparing these two law texts, we observe that there are no substance differences, 
but only of nuance: while article 40, paragraph (5), Civil Procedure Code from 
1865, expressly provides that only the acts fulfilled after the venue changing, as 
well as the decision given, will be lawfully annulled, art. 145, paragraph (2), Civil 
Procedure Code shows that “in case the Court from where the venue changing was 
decided has meanwhile judged the trial, the decision given is lawfully annulled by 
the effect of allowing the motion to change venue”, being able to conclude logically 
that this last “meanwhile” cannot refer but to the period after the venue changing is 
decided.   
In these conditions, we should identify the source of this confusion, being known 
the fact that in the previous practice according to the former Civil Procedure Code, 
the practice of the venue changing Court (of High Court of Cassation and Justice – 
being exclusively competent in solving the motions to change venue) was to reject 
the motion to change venue on grounds of being without object, in case the trial 
whose solving was requested was solved, in the period from introducing the motion 
to change venue and up to the Court decision regarding this request2.  
                                                          
1 This law was published in the Official Gazette of Romania no. 365 from May 30th, 2012 and it 
entered into force on the date of February 13th, 2013. 
2 Please see Conclusion no. 670/2013 of the High Court of Cassation and Justice given on the date of 
February 12th, 2013, in the File no. 7631/1/2012, available on the Internet: 
http://www.scj.ro/1093/Detalii-
jurisprudenta?customQuery%5B0%5D.Key=id&customQuery%5B0%5D.Value=94033. We mention 
that in this case, the petitioner requested the motion to change venue to be allowed, the Prosecutor 
had given conclusions of rejecting the motion as being without object, and the solution was the 
rejection, without taking into consideration the lack of object of the request. Indeed, according to art. 
40, paragraph (4), Civil Procedure Code, the decision on venue changing is given without motivation 
and is not submitted to any way of attack. We consider that the requirement of the law to be given 
without motivation does not refer but to the reasons invoked in the motion, the Court being able to 
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Checking the content of art. 140, paragraph  (1) and (2), Civil Procedure Code, in 
the initial form of the new Civil Procedure Code, it had the following content: in 
case the motion to change venue is allowed, the trial is send to other Court of the 
same rank in order to be judged. The decision will show the degree in which the 
acts fulfilled by the Court before the venue changing are going to be kept. In case 
the Court from where the venue changing is decided has committed procedural 
acts or has meanwhile judged the case, the procedural acts fulfilled after the 
motion to change venue was filed and the decision give are lawfully annulled by 
the effect of allowing the motion to change venue.  
Accordingly, this text refers to committing the procedural acts after the motion to 
change venue was filed and the decision given after this moment. From the text, 
it results that the collocation “meanwhile” refers to the moment of filing the 
motion to change venue and not to the venue changing granted, already approved 
by the Court1.  
From the point of view of its initial content, the actual art. 145, paragraph (2), 
second thesis, Civil Procedure Code, does not seem so clear and predictable for the 
Judge that knows there is filed a motion to change venue in the file. For him/her, it 
is clear only that the decision he/she will give can be lawfully annulled by the 
effect of allowing the motion to change venue. 
On the other hand, in case it would be considered a motion to change the venue of 
a trial is allowable, although, at the date of the investigation and of the decision 
given by the competent judge in the motion to change venue, it was finally solved, 
it would come for certain to a consequence which is as obvious as it is dangerous, 
namely that of infringing res judicata of a decision2, meaning the Court invested 
                                                                                                                                                   
consider that the motion has no object. We point out that even under the effects of the actual Code, 
the decision on the venue changing is given without motivation (art. 144 para (2) the actual Civil 
Procedure Code), circumstance which in our opinion does not impede the motivation of the solution 
to annul the venue changing motion for not paying the stamp duty, for example. To this effect, please 
see the Concusion no. 2900 given on the date of September 25th, 2015, by the High Court of 
Cassation and Justice, in the File no. 2752/1/2015. Moreso, the fact that in the Code it is provided the 
necessity to notify the Court from where the venue changing was requested, at once, regarding the 
allowance or rejection of the motion to change venue, cannot lead to the conclusion that in the case 
there cannot be given other solutions but those of allowace or of rejection.   
1 Under the effects of the previous regulation, there were lawfully annulled all acts fulfilled, 
respectively the decision given after the motion to change venue was allowed. Please see (Leș, 2011, 
p. 240). This author points out that: „the text therefore declares as lawfully annulled, through the 
effect of allowing the motion to change venue, all procedural acts – including the decision – brought 
to fulfilment after the motion to change venue was filed”.  
2 Please see (Tăbârcă & Buta, 2007, p. 181).  
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with the motion to change venue, deciding to allow the motion to change venue of 
a solved trial, implicitly annuls the decision given in the case.  
Implicitly, it should be recognised the fact that by promoting a motion to change 
venue, it makes possible the annulment of a decision, of course if it is considered 
that the impartiality of one/more magistrates was affected. But this lack of 
impartiality must be seen from the point of view of the decision already given, 
circumstance which transforms the venue changing Court in an instrument which 
makes possible annulling a decision entered in res judicata.   
This situation, corroborated with the circumstance that the magistrates are 
exonerated from the obligation to motivate the decision given in the venue 
changing, makes the motion to change venue a dangerous instrument, the party 
who lost the trial receiving “a second chance” to have analysed his/her case.  
This “second chance” must be analysed from the point of view of the further 
conduct of the party that invested the Court with a motion to change venue, being 
unconceivable to support a motion to change venue for a trial in which the party 
has won. 
Accordingly, in case the party which receives an unfavourable solution will 
reinforce the formulated motion to change venue of the trial, while, in the situation 
the trial is won, one of the essential conditions of exercising the civil action is 
missing, namely the one of interest, which must subsist also at the moment the 
venue changing motion is solved. 
For the other party, which considered there are no reasons of lawful doubt in the 
case and did not formulate a motion to change venue, but who lost the trial, this 
“second chance” does not exist anymore, not being the holder of the motion to 
change venue.  
The intent of the legislator was not to change the venue changing institution into a 
“trick” at the hand of the litigants, reason for which article 140 Civil Procedure 
Code (the actual article 145, paragraph (2), second thesis) was amended, receiving 
the content announced previously.  
We appreciate that, against the consequences which such a solution can produce, it 
was necessary that the legislation would expressly provide the impossibility to 
change the venue of the solved trial, if the venue changing Court did not decide 
trial suspension in the case and moreso, the situation when trial suspension was not 
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requested, on one hand, or to define clearly the collocation “meanwhile” by taking 
into consideration the factual hypotheses previously announced. 
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